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ABSTRACT—In recent years, the wetland mitigation banking program has 
emerged as a favored mechanism for protecting the nation’s aquatic 
resources while allowing for economically beneficial development projects 
to proceed. Mitigation banks generate wetland credits, which in turn can be 
sold at a profit to developers who need them to offset wetland impacts. The 
number of mitigation banks has grown significantly in recent years, and the 
market has seen an influx of institutional investment. However, investors 
face significant risks and uncertainty, and many prospective investors lack 
access to information about wetland credit prices—which are neither 
reported to the regulatory authorities nor made available to the general 
public—and are therefore deterred from entering the market. 
This Note proposes that the market for wetland mitigation credits would 
be more efficient if bank sponsors were required to report credit price 
information to regulatory authorities and if this information were made 
publicly available. Transparency of credit price information would 
incentivize both greater entry into the wetland mitigation banking market 
and improved planning on the part of prospective bank sponsors and 
developers alike. Moreover, by encouraging the establishment of more 
mitigation banks, regulatory authorities would have greater ability to ensure 
wetland credits purchased by developers more accurately match the type and 
functional values of the wetlands impacted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Risk and uncertainty feature prominently in many investment decisions. 
An individual purchasing a rental property bears the risks that she may be 
unable to rent out the property and that the resale value may decline or fail 
to grow as expected. A financial institution extending credit faces the 
possibility that a borrower may be unable to repay the borrowed funds. 
Actors generally consult available information to reduce some of the sources 
of uncertainty associated with such investment decisions. For instance, an 
individual may confine her purchase to neighborhoods with low vacancy 
rates and above-average historical home price appreciation; likewise, to 
account for risk of default, a financial institution may price a loan based on 
the borrower’s known income sources and credit history. A deep pool of 
available information guides these actors’ investment decisions. 
In the last few decades, wetland mitigation banking has emerged as a 
new form of land investment that offers attractive returns, yet is 
characterized by a general lack of available information to guide investment 
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decisions.1 The wetland mitigation banking program arises from federal 
wetland protections governed by Section 404 of the Clean Water Act 
(CWA).2 In geographic markets with appropriate credit demand from 
development activity,3 the program allows an investor who adheres to 
specified guidelines to become a sponsor of a wetland mitigation bank—a 
physical land site that generates wetland credits that can be used to offset 
wetland impacts within the same ecological region.4 The bank sponsor 
creates the mitigation bank by restoring wetland ecological functions to 
previously destroyed or degraded wetlands, enhancing or preserving existing 
wetlands, or creating new wetlands.5 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the 
Corps), in concert with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
various other regulatory agencies, administers the program,6 based on a set 
of ecological performance goals to which the bank sponsor and the 
regulatory agencies agree.7 As the site achieves these goals, the local Corps 
district overseeing the mitigation bank releases credit to the bank.8 The bank 
sponsor can then sell these credits to developers responsible for causing 
impacts on wetlands that require offsets under the CWA and its 
 
 1 See J. B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Effects of Wetland Mitigation Banking on People, NAT’L 
WETLANDS NEWSL., Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 1, 9 (discussing the “data vacuum” around wetland mitigation 
banking and noting that, while wetland mitigation “credit prices are not publicly available, they are 
reported to vary widely [and] average well into the tens of thousands of dollars per credit”); see also 
Mitigation Credit Price Report (MCPR), EASI, http://www.easillc.com/mitigation-credit-price-report-
mcpr [https://perma.cc/ZX4C-AS2D] (advertising a privately managed information database for 
mitigation banking and explaining that “[m]arket transparency has been low and credit price volatility 
has been high”). Credits are the units of transaction used in wetland mitigation banking, which is 
discussed throughout this Note. 
 2 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012) (authorizing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to “issue permits . . . 
for the discharge of dredged or fill material into . . . navigable waters”). 
 3 Any development activity that requires the dredging or filling of wetlands can create demand for 
wetland credits. See PATRICK W. HOOK & SPENSER T. SHADLE, NAVIGATING WETLAND MITIGATION 
MARKETS: A STUDY OF RISKS FACING ENTREPRENEURS AND REGULATORS 5 (2013), https://www.cbd. 
int/financial/offsets/usa-offsetmitigationrisks.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKB3-8FVP]. Examples of 
development projects giving rise to demand for credits include transportation infrastructure such as roads 
and bridges, residential and commercial real estate development, utility lines, and gas pipelines. Id. 
 4 See Mitigation Banking Factsheet, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/mitigation-banking-
factsheet [https://perma.cc/J968-K36H]; Wetland Mitigation Banks: An Option to Consider, TERRACON 
(Sept. 4, 2014), https://www.terracon.com/2014/09/04/wetland-mitigation-banks-an-option-to-consider 
[https://perma.cc/2RUW-W5EH] (“Wetland mitigation banking is a form of environmental market 
trading. Property owners can, at their own expense, restore, enhance, or construct a wetland, which creates 
wetland credits. Wetland credits can be sold to other developers who are facing expenses and delays that 
can be associated with impacting jurisdictional [wetlands].”). 
 5 See Mitigation Banking Factsheet, supra note 4. 
 6 See infra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 7 See Mitigation Banking Factsheet, supra note 4. 
 8 See id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
374 
implementing regulations.9 Depending on the amount and type of demand 
for credits and the competing credit supply from other banks in the 
geographic market, these credits can be incredibly valuable and can provide 
a generous return on the bank sponsor’s initial investment.10 The investment 
community has taken notice of this significant opportunity: one private 
equity firm that specializes in the management of mitigation banking sites 
recently closed a third round of investment exceeding $300 million in capital 
commitments.11 
While investment in wetland mitigation banking can be lucrative, there 
are many sources of risk and uncertainty that accompany the decision to 
invest in a mitigation bank. The regulatory approval process required to 
operate a mitigation bank can stretch over several years,12 during which time 
a prospective bank sponsor may face considerable uncertainty with respect 
to the amount of credits a proposed bank site can generate, the timing of 
credit releases to the bank, and the geographic region in which the bank 
sponsor can sell credits.13 Moreover, throughout the permitting process, a 
bank sponsor may lack a clear understanding of what prices these credits can 
generate.14 There is currently no requirement for bank sponsors to report the 
prices of credits sold to developers.15 Without such historical price 
information, an otherwise willing mitigation bank sponsor may elect not to 
enter the market, hamstringing the ability of developers to secure credits 
needed to pursue economically beneficial projects. 
While a significant amount of academic scholarship examines wetlands 
regulation and the regulatory framework around the mitigation banking 
 
 9 See, e.g., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, PUB. NO. 12-06-014, 
CREDIT GUIDE FOR WETLAND MITIGATION BANKS 2 (2013) [hereinafter WASH. CREDIT GUIDE] (“Credits 
are periodically released . . . throughout the establishment period of a bank, which typically lasts for 10 
to 12 years, as performance standards are met. Once a potential credit is released . . . it becomes an 
available credit.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 10 Tegan Wendland, Restoration Work Profitable for ‘Mitigation Banks,’ WWNO (Nov. 23, 2015), 
http://wwno.org/post/restoration-work-profitable-mitigation-banks [https://perma.cc/Q6EV-AM5Y] 
(characterizing mitigation banking as “pretty lucrative” and reporting that one industry participant 
estimated that an acre of marsh he is restoring “could sell for between $35,000 and $150,000”). 
 11 EIP Closes Fund III with Capital Commitment of $303 Million, ECOSYSTEM INV. PARTNERS (Feb. 
16, 2016), https://ecosystempartners.com/2016/02/16/eip-closes-fund-iii-with-capital-commitment-of-
303-million [https://perma.cc/E55v-2E66]. 
 12 See Leonard Shabman & Paul Scodari, The Future of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20 CHOICES 
65, 66 (2005). 
 13 See HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 11; see also infra text accompanying notes 160–63 
(describing regulatory risks facing prospective bank sponsors). 
 14 See infra Section IV.B. 
 15 See infra Section IV.B. 
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program,16 there has been little focus on the specific decision-making of 
investors who are considering entrance into the market as bank sponsors. 
This Note attempts to begin the discussion concerning how improvements to 
the regulatory framework can encourage entry into the market. At bottom, 
the market for wetland mitigation credits would be better served if bank 
sponsors were required to report the sale price of credits to the Corps, and if 
the Corps then made this information publicly available for those considering 
entering the market as sponsors of wetland mitigation banks. The CWA and 
its regulations permit regulatory authorities to require the reporting of credit 
price information, and this information could be collected within the Corps’s 
existing reporting framework for credit sales.17 Public availability of 
historical credit price information would encourage greater entry into the 
market on the part of both bank sponsors and developers, thereby facilitating 
a more competitive marketplace for wetland credits, and ultimately leading 
to more economically beneficial investment in land development and 
wetland protection. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on the 
historical treatment of wetlands in the United States, the emergence of the 
current regulatory regime, and the origins and explosive growth of wetland 
mitigation banking activity since the EPA and the Corps promulgated 
regulations in 2008 establishing a preference for mitigation banking. Part II 
considers and addresses the arguments of scholars and environmentalists 
who question whether improving the efficiency of the compensatory offset 
regime is desirable and whether mitigation banking should be explicitly 
favored over other options. Next, Part III analyzes the costs and risks that 
accompany development of a wetland mitigation bank within the current 
regulatory framework. Finally, Part IV discusses the benefits of credit price 
transparency in the wetland mitigation banking market, and then argues that 
the mitigation banking program would be improved by changing the credit 
transaction reporting process to require bank sponsors to report the price of 
credit sales to the Corps, which would then publish the price information. 
I. EVOLUTION IN WETLAND REGULATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING PROGRAM 
The treatment of wetlands in the United States has undergone 
significant changes throughout the country’s history. Once seen as a scourge 
on society and a public health risk, wetlands began to receive recognition for 
 
 16 For a review of this academic scholarship and the debates around wetland regulation and the 
mitigation banking program, see infra Part II. 
 17 See infra Section IV.C. 
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their environmental benefits in the middle of the twentieth century, paving 
the way for the enactment of wetland protection legislation in the 1970s.18 
Since then, the regulatory environment has shifted toward one that favors 
mitigation banking over other approaches and has spurred rapid growth in 
both the number of mitigation banks and the volume of investment in 
mitigation banks. This Part describes the evolution in wetland protection and 
provides context for why mitigation banking has become a more important 
and favored approach for wetland protection in the United States. 
A. Early Treatment of Wetlands in the United States 
From the Colonial Era up until the latter half of the twentieth century, 
the general view toward wetlands in the United States was one that 
encouraged their destruction. Early European settlers in the United States 
brought with them views from their home countries toward wetlands as a 
source of diseases such as malaria.19 In 1900, the Supreme Court condemned 
wetlands as “the cause of malarial and malignant fevers” and opined that “the 
police power is never more legitimately exercised than in removing such 
nuisances.”20 The general view of wetlands as “disease-ridden 
wastelands”—and the accompanying view that they should be filled and 
drained as a matter of public health—thus prevailed prior to the 1960s.21 
In the 1980s, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) commissioned 
a study on the historical rates and trends in wetland loss in the United 
States.22 According to the FWS study, more than 50% of the country’s 
original 221 million acres of wetlands had been destroyed during the 200 
years between the Colonial Era and the mid-1980s, and most of this acreage 
loss could be directly attributed to human activity.23 In addition to draining 
for disease control, a large source of wetland loss in the United States took 
the form of drainage to facilitate agricultural production.24 The study also 
 
 18 See Lori A. Sutter et al., Science and Policy of U.S. Wetlands, 29 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 42–50 
(2015) (discussing the history of wetland losses in the United States and the emergence of wetland 
protective legislation). 
 19 See id. at 44. Indeed, wetlands can cause the spread of water- and vector-borne diseases. Id. 
 20 Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900). 
 21 Sutter et al., supra note 18, at 32. 
 22 THOMAS E. DAHL & CRAIG E. JOHNSON, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., 
WETLANDS: STATUS AND TRENDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS UNITED STATES, MID-1970’S TO MID-1980’S, 
at iii (1991). 
 23 Id. at 3. 
 24 Id. at 12. As discussed later in this Note, previously drained wetlands represent ideal sites for the 
establishment of wetland mitigation banks. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. Because many 
large agricultural tracts were previously drained wetlands, owners of such farmland may benefit from the 
opportunity to convert parts of these parcels into successful wetland mitigation banks by engaging in 
wetland restoration projects. Id. 
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found that between the mid-1950s and the mid-1970s, agricultural activity 
was the cause of 87% of wetland conversions to upland land uses.25 
In recent decades, scientific advancement has spurred greater national 
attention to the benefits that wetlands provide to the ecosystem—also known 
as “ecosystem services.” University of Georgia research scientist Lori Sutter 
and her coauthors organize the value26 of wetlands into three general 
categories: water quality, hydrology, and habitat.27 First, wetlands improve 
water quality by capturing sediments and other particulates as they move 
across the landscape and by facilitating microbially mediated chemical 
reactions.28 Second, the ability of wetlands to slow and retain water 
contributes to flood abatement and erosion control.29 Finally, wetlands 
provide habitat for a wide range of plants and animals.30 It is in part the 
greater recognition of these benefits that gave rise to the enactment of federal 
wetland protection legislation in the latter half of the twentieth century.31 
B. Wetland Regulation: The Clean Water Act and No Net Loss 
Following decades of programs designed to encourage the draining of 
wetlands for agriculture and other purposes, Congress amended preexisting 
federal law governing water pollution by enacting the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 to “restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”32 
Congress again amended the law in the Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA), 
motivated in part by the desire to establish the Corps’s authority to regulate 
activities involving impacts on wetlands.33 Congressional debate leading up 
to the passage of the 1977 Amendments reflected the increased focus on the 
 
 25 See DAHL & JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 12. 
 26 Since wetland systems are generally not bought or sold, techniques have been developed to assign 
economic value to wetlands; this value can vary based on the specific individual or society making this 
valuation. See Sutter et al., supra note 18, at 32–33. 
 27 See id. at 33–34. 
 28 See id. at 34–38. 
 29 See id. at 38–40. 
 30 See id. at 40–42. 
 31 See id. at 32. Doctor Sutter and her coauthors argue that the passage of the Federal Clean Water 
Act of 1972, providing “limited wetland protection,” was “recognition of humankind’s valuation of 
wetland functions.” Id. at 32–33. 
 32 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified 
as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012)). Among the goals established by the Amendments was 
the “national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.” Id. 
 33 Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251–1387 (2012)); James R. Curtiss, Note, The Clean Water Act of 1977: Midcourse Corrections in 
the Section 404 Program, 57 NEB. L. REV. 1092, 1107–09 (1978) (describing Congress’s “efforts to 
amend the section 404 program and, in the process, to redefine the Corps’[s] jurisdiction over dredge and 
fill operations”). 
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value of aquatic ecosystems such as wetlands and the need for their 
protection from the harms of human activity. As Senator Edmund Muskie of 
Maine explained: 
There is no question that man’s activities have radically altered receiving water 
ecosystems in this country and that alteration is continuing at an accelerated 
pace in many areas. Restoration of aquatic ecosystems which existed prior to 
the introduction of pollution from man’s activities is an important element of 
the restoration and maintenance of the biological, physical, and chemical 
integrity of receiving waters. It is an essential aspect of assuring that future 
generations will have an adequate supply of basic life support resources.34 
The CWA was thus viewed as an important tool to fight the trend of losses 
in aquatic ecosystems that had characterized the nation’s environmental 
policy throughout history. 
Section 301 of the CWA contains the crux of the protection of aquatic 
ecosystems by making “the discharge of any pollutant by any person . . . 
unlawful.”35 This prohibition covers activities that involve dredging or filling 
jurisdictional wetlands.36 Section 404 of the Act, however, provides an 
exception to the Section 301 prohibition by granting the Corps authority to 
 
 34 123 CONG. REC. 39,179 (1977) (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie). 
 35 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012). 
 36 The Act defines jurisdictional wetlands as “the waters of the United States.” Id. § 1362(7). The 
exact meaning of this term, which has been the subject of a trilogy of Supreme Court cases, remains 
unsettled. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985) (finding that 
“legislative history and underlying policies of [the Corps’s] statutory grants of authority . . . support the 
reasonableness of the Corps’[s] approach of defining adjacent wetlands as ‘waters [of the United States]’ 
within the meaning of § 404(a)” of the CWA); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding that the Corps’s jurisdiction under the CWA does not extend to 
isolated wetlands that lack a “significant nexus” to navigable waters); see also Rapanos v. United States, 
547 U.S. 715 (2006) (vacating judgments against petitioners—who filled wetlands without permits—with 
no majority opinion, but laying out alternative bases: either that wetlands that lack “continuous surface 
connection to bodies that are ‘waters of the United States’ in their own right” (under Justice Scalia’s 
standard), or that the lower court misapplied the “significant nexus” test from Solid Waste Agency of 
Northern Cook County (under Justice Kennedy’s standard)). The definition currently used by federal 
agencies is the 1986/1988 Regulatory Definition promulgated by the EPA, which was implemented 
consistent with these Supreme Court decisions and EPA guidance documents. See U.S. EPA, ABOUT 
WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES (2018), https://www.epa.gov/wotus-rule/about-waters-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/25G9-68DU]; see also Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 
80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,116 (June 29, 2015) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. § 230.3) (listing the 
complex set of waterbodies included in and excluded from the definition). Agencies currently exert 
jurisdiction only over wetlands that are navigable or have a significant nexus to a traditionally navigable 
body of water. See Sutter et al., supra note 18, at 47. Despite the fact that changes in federal jurisdiction 
of wetlands—whether driven by Congress, the courts, or executive agencies—could impact demand for 
wetland mitigation credits, the exact jurisdiction of the Act does not impact the thrust of this Note’s 
argument, which focuses on the opacity of credit price information. See infra Part IV. 
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issue permits for dredge-and-fill activities in wetlands.37 While the Corps is 
directly responsible for administering the Section 404 Permit Program, it 
must follow EPA-promulgated standards under Section 404(b)(1) when 
issuing permits.38 Under the Act, a developer is typically required to secure 
a Section 404 permit prior to engaging in a land development project that 
requires the dredging or filling of regulated wetlands.39 
In the late 1980s, the National Wetlands Policy Forum, a stakeholder 
panel focused on wetland conservation, developed the goal of “no net loss” 
of wetlands.40 The Forum’s goal referred to preserving both the total wetland 
acreage in the country and the functions and values that the wetlands 
provided.41 Then-presidential candidate George H.W. Bush incorporated this 
 
 37 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012) (“The Secretary [of the Army] may issue permits . . . for the 
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”). During 
passage of the 1977 Amendments, some in Congress viewed aspects of the Section 404 permitting process 
as harmful to the goal of wetland protection. For example, Representative Jerome Ambro of New York 
expressed skepticism about the Corps’s authority under the Act to issue a “general” permit on a state, 
regional, or nationwide basis giving a state control over jurisdictional wetlands, explaining: “Without 
close supervision from either the corps or the Environmental Protection Agency, we will almost certainly 
see economically expedient activities, such as construction, development, and even some dumping, take 
precedent over the preservation of the ecological sensitive and valuable wetlands.” 123 CONG. REC. 
38,994 (statement of Rep. Jerome Ambro). Senator Robert Stafford of Vermont lamented the Act’s 
exemption of congressionally authorized projects from Section 404 permitting requirements, arguing that 
“all projects . . . ought to measure up to the standards designed to protect vital and often irreplaceable 
wetlands and marine environments from the devastation of pollution and the total obliteration by 
development or altered land use.” Id. at 39,192 (statement of Sen. Robert Stafford). 
 38 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (“[E]ach . . . disposal site shall be specified for each such permit by the 
Secretary [of the Corps] . . . through the application of guidelines developed by the Administrator [of the 
EPA] . . . .”); see also J.B. Ruhl et al., Implementing the New Ecosystem Services Mandate of the Section 
404 Compensatory Mitigation Program—A Catalyst for Advancing Science and Policy, 38 STETSON L. 
REV. 251, 252–53 (2009). Section 404(c) also provides that the EPA may veto a permit issued by the 
Corps. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c). 
 39 U.S. EPA, SECTION 404 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT: SECTION 404 PERMIT PROGRAM (2017), 
https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/section-404-permit-program [https://perma.cc/8TMW-5UCR]. 
 40 See JULIE M. SIBBING, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, NOWHERE NEAR NO-NET-LOSS 1, https://www. 
nwf.org/~/media/PDFs/Wildlife/Nowhere_Near_No-Net-Loss.pdf [https://perma.cc/UND6-BJE8]. See 
generally U.S. EPA, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR WETLANDS: NATIONAL GUIDANCE (1990), 
https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/00001PW6.PDF?Dockey=00001PW6.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/LE73-7KGC]. 
 41 See SIBBING, supra note 40, at 1. 
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goal into his 1988 presidential campaign,42 and by 1990, the EPA and the 
Corps had formally adopted the goal as Bush administration policy.43 
Under EPA regulations, a developer applying for a Section 404 permit 
is required to offset any unavoidable impacts caused by the developer in 
order to prevent a net loss of wetlands.44 In order to receive a permit, the 
developer must follow an exact sequence of steps: first, avoid impacts on 
aquatic resources; second, minimize the extent of unavoidable ecological 
damage; and finally, compensate for unavoidable damages.45 This 
compensatory mitigation requirement can be achieved through “restoration 
of a previously-existing wetland or other aquatic site, the enhancement of an 
existing aquatic site’s functions, the establishment (i.e., creation) of a new 
aquatic site, or the preservation of an existing aquatic site.”46 Moreover, 
under the no net loss policy, the compensatory mitigation requirement is set 
 
 42 Keith Schneider, The Nation; The Environmental Impact of President Bush, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 
1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/25/weekinreview/the-nation-the-environmental-impact-of-
president-bush.html [https://perma.cc/X7CF-DMCU]. President Bush maintained his stance on the no net 
loss policy once in office, stating to members of the conservation group Ducks Unlimited in a 1989 
address: 
I want to ask you today what the generations to follow will say of us 40 years from now. It could 
be they’ll report the loss of many million acres more, the extinction of species, the disappearance 
of wilderness and wildlife; or they could report something else. They could report that sometime 
around 1989 things began to change and that we began to hold on to our parks and refuges and that 
we protected our species and that in that year the seeds of a new policy about our valuable wetlands 
were sown, a policy summed up in three simple words: “No net loss.” 
President George Bush, Address to Ducks Unlimited (June 8, 1989), as reprinted in Morgan M. 
Robertson, No Net Loss: Wetland Restoration and the Incomplete Capitalization of Nature, 32 ANTIPODE 
463, 463 (2000). 
 43 U.S. EPA & U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CONCERNING THE 
DETERMINATION OF MITIGATION UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 404(B)(1) GUIDELINES 2 
(1990) [hereinafter 1990 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT] (“[I]t is recognized that no net loss of wetlands 
functions and values may not be achieved in each and every permit action. However, it remains a goal of 
the Section 404 regulatory program to contribute to the national goal of no overall net loss of the nation’s 
remaining wetlands base.”). 
 44 See 40 C.F.R. § 230.93(a)(1) (2017) (“Permit applicants are responsible for proposing an 
appropriate compensatory mitigation option to offset unavoidable impacts.”); see also Adrienne M. 
Sakyi, Note, Mitigation Banking: Is State Assumption of Permitting Authority More Effective?, 34 WM. 
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1027, 1029 (2010) (“When a developer’s negative impact on wetlands 
is unavoidable, compensatory mitigation is required to offset the harmful impacts on function and losses 
of aquatic resources that result from the authorized activity in order to prevent a net loss of wetlands.”). 
 45 See 40 C.F.R. § 230.91(c). While compensatory mitigation is intended to be a choice of last resort 
used only to compensate for unavoidable wetland impacts, in practice the sequencing requirement is not 
faithfully followed—in fact, the Corps typically denies less than one percent of all permits applied for, 
and it grants the majority of permits under an expedited general permit process. See Murphy et al., New 
Mitigation Rule Promises More of the Same: Why the New Corps and EPA Mitigation Rule Will Fail to 
Protect Our Aquatic Resources Adequately, 38 STETSON L. REV. 311, 315 (2009). 
 46 Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 
19,594 (Apr. 10, 2008) (codified at 33 C.F.R. §§ 325, 332, and 40 C.F.R. § 230) (emphasis omitted). 
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by the Corps such that a development project requiring a Section 404 permit 
should not result in an overall decrease in the total acreage of wetlands. For 
instance, between 1993 and 2000, the Corps issued permits for 
approximately 24,000 acres of wetlands per year to be filled, and required 
42,000 acres of compensatory mitigation for these impacts––an average of 
1.8 acres of compensatory mitigation for every acre of wetland impact.47 
Federal regulations provide three different options by which a permit 
applicant can provide compensatory mitigation.48 The first and most 
common form is permittee-responsible mitigation (PRM), whereby the 
permit applicant is responsible for ensuring that ecological performance 
standards are met to satisfy the mitigation requirements.49 PRM can occur 
either at the site of impact or at an adjacent site.50 The permittee generally 
seeks the help of outside consultants to develop a mitigation site, and the 
permittee arranges for any necessary conservation easements to encumber 
the land that hosts the site.51 
The second option is participation in an in-lieu fee (ILF) program. 
Under this option, the permittee pays a fee to a government agency or a 
nonprofit organization that operates a separate ILF mitigation site.52 The ILF 
operator can pool money from multiple permittees to develop larger, more 
comprehensive mitigation sites compared to PRM sites.53 Typically, the 
mitigation work performed by ILF operators occurs after the permittee has 
already received a permit to impact wetlands.54 
The final option allows the permittee to purchase an appropriate number 
of credits, as determined by the Corps, from an approved wetland mitigation 
bank, which may be operated by for-profit companies, nonprofit 
 
 47 See COMM. ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPENSATING FOR 
WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 3 (2001). But see R. Eugene Turner et al., Count It 
by Acre or Function—Mitigation Adds Up to Net Loss of Wetlands, NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSL., Nov.–
Dec. 2001, at 5, 15 (explaining that because not all mitigation projects are implemented in compliance 
with permitting requirements, “the actual amount of wetland impacts offset is only about 20 percent, 
meaning that the section 404 permitting program has been fostering an 80 percent net loss of wetlands”). 
 48 See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 19,594 
(“There are three mechanisms for providing compensatory mitigation: permittee-responsible . . . 
mitigation, mitigation banks and in-lieu fee mitigation.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 49 See id.; Sakyi, supra note 44, at 1030; Philip Womble & Martin Doyle, The Geography of Trading 
Ecosystem Services: A Case Study of Wetland and Stream Compensatory Mitigation Markets, 36 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 229, 249 (2012). 
 50 See Sakyi, supra note 44, at 1030; Womble & Doyle, supra note 49, at 249. 
 51 See Jessica Owley, The Increasing Privatization of Environmental Permitting, 46 AKRON L. REV. 
1091, 1097 (2013). 
 52 See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 
19,594–95; Owley, supra note 51, at 1098. 
 53 See Owley, supra note 51, at 1098. 
 54 See Murphy et al., supra note 45, at 317 n.28. 
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organizations, or state agencies.55 Mitigation banks generate compensatory 
mitigation credits issued by the Corps, which are generally based on the 
“ecological gains” as measured by factors such as the acreage and functional 
value of the wetlands or other aquatic resources generated on the site.56 A 
permittee can then purchase credits from the bank—at a price determined by 
the sponsor (i.e., operator) of the bank and agreeable to the permittee—to 
satisfy the permittee’s Section 404 compensation requirements.57 The credit 
transaction includes a transfer of liability for performance at the 
compensation site from the permittee to the bank sponsor.58 Unlike for ILF 
sites and PRM projects, the mitigation activity that occurs at a mitigation 
bank typically occurs before any corresponding credit is issued to the bank 
for sale to permittees; therefore, at the time a permittee purchases credit to 
satisfy the compensatory requirement for securing a Section 404 permit, the 
corresponding mitigation activity has already occurred.59 
C. The Rise of Entrepreneurial Mitigation Banking and the  
2008 Final Rule 
The first mitigation banks appeared in the early 1980s.60 Rather than 
operating as entrepreneurial sites seeking to profit from credit sales to third 
parties, the initial banks were single-user sites developed by Section 404 
permittees themselves.61 The banks provided advance compensation to 
satisfy the permittees’ significant anticipated compensatory mitigation 
requirements.62 A 1988 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) study 
identified thirteen banks with FWS involvement: ten were operated by and 
for the use of port authorities and state departments of transportation; the 
others involved oil and gas exploration and industrial development.63 In 
1986, a mitigation bank in Louisiana that was predominantly established to 
 
 55 See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 
19,594–95; Owley, supra note 51, at 1098. Privately held bank sites must be encumbered by a 
conservation easement ensuring that the lands remain undeveloped and protected as an aquatic resource. 
See id. at 1109. 
 56 See, e.g., WASH. CREDIT GUIDE, supra note 9, at 2. 
 57 See Womble & Doyle, supra note 49, at 249. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. (“Mitigation banks are . . . temporally preferable to PRM and ILF programs, as compensation 
is generally initiated in advance of credit transactions.”). But see Murphy et al., supra note 45, at 317 
(“[I]n practice, nearly all credits are sold before restoration is considered complete and successful, and 
many are sold before restoration even begins.”). 
 60 Womble & Doyle, supra note 49, at 249. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 CATHLEEN SHORT, MITIGATION BANKING 39 (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Biological Report 
88(41), 1988). 
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serve the bank sponsor’s own internal demand arranged for the first third-
party transaction for Section 404 compensatory mitigation credits.64 
Despite its early usage by some large permittees, mitigation banking 
enjoyed limited prominence throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.65 During 
this period, a loose patchwork of regulations and guidance documents 
governed the mitigation banking program, creating a disjointed regulatory 
regime.66 A 1990 Memorandum of Understanding between the Corps and the 
EPA established a regulatory preference that “[c]ompensatory actions . . . be 
undertaken, when practicable, in areas adjacent or contiguous to the 
discharge site.”67 This preference for on-site mitigation made necessarily off-
site mitigation banking impracticable for many permittees. Moreover, 
mitigation banks had higher technological standards and were more 
expensive compared to PRM projects.68 As a result, most developers 
preferred doing PRM projects to utilizing mitigation banks.69 
The 1990s, however, saw the beginning of a shift toward mitigation 
banking activity along with the emergence of entrepreneurial mitigation 
banking. In 1992, a mitigation bank in Georgia received the first permit for 
the operation of a purely entrepreneurial wetland mitigation bank,70 and in 
1994, the first mitigation banking instrument (MBI)71 was issued to a for-
profit mitigation bank in Illinois.72 Then, in 1995, the Corps and the EPA, in 
concert with other federal agencies, issued regulatory guidance stating that 
the “agencies’ preference for on-site mitigation . . . should not preclude the 
 
 64 Womble & Doyle, supra note 49, at 250. 
 65 LEONARD SHABMAN & PAUL SCODARI, INST. FOR WATER RESOURCES, NATIONAL WETLAND 




(“Despite the potential of off-site mitigation banking to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
wetland regulation, its use to date has been very limited. This is because traditional single-user banking 
arrangements are necessarily limited to those large public and private developers that routinely undertake 
many independent or linear development projects and can afford a substantial up-front investment in 
compensatory mitigation.”). 
 66 See Sakyi, supra note 44, at 1031. 
 67 1990 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 43, at 4. 
 68 See Sakyi, supra note 44, at 1031. 
 69 See id. 
 70 ENVTL. LAW INST., NATIONAL FORUM ON SYNERGIES BETWEEN WATER QUALITY TRADING AND 
WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING: FORUM REPORT 6 (2005), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/ 
eli-pubs/d16_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE3M-24QT] [hereinafter ELI FORUM REPORT]. 
 71 The mitigation banking instrument is the “legal document for the establishment, operation, and 
use of a mitigation bank.” 33 C.F.R. § 332.2 (2017). The instrument establishes the legal duties the bank 
sponsor must meet in order to sell credits. See ELI FORUM REPORT, supra note 70, at 29. 
 72 ELI FORUM REPORT, supra note 70, at 6. 
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use of a mitigation bank when there is no practicable opportunity for on-site 
compensation, or when use of a bank is environmentally preferable to on-
site compensation.”73 The guidance also established that, as a requirement of 
selling mitigation credits, banks were required to first receive approval from 
an interagency review team (IRT)74 consisting of representatives from the 
Corps, EPA, and concerned federal, state, tribal, and local authorities, with 
the local Corps district engineer generally serving as the IRT chair.75 The 
participating agencies become signatories of the MBIs, with the goal of 
achieving consensus on the MBIs’ terms and conditions.76 Investors 
interpreted the guidance as sanctioning private mitigation banking, and 
entrepreneurial investment in the nascent industry increased.77 
As mitigation banking gained prominence in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, the benefits of compensatory mitigation in general—which continued 
to consist predominantly of PRM projects78—began to raise concerns from 
the environmental community.79 At the request of the EPA, the National 
Research Council (NRC) conducted a detailed study, which found that the 
“goal of no net loss of wetlands is not being met for wetland functions by the 
mitigation program, despite progress in the last 20 years.”80 The NRC report 
 
 73 Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 
58,605, 58,611 (Nov. 28, 1995). 
 74 The guidance referred to this as the Mitigation Bank Review Team (MBRT). Id. at 58,610. The 
concept is identical to what current regulations define as the IRT. Compare id. (“Collectively, the 
signatory agencies to the banking instrument will comprise the Mitigation Bank Review Team (MBRT). 
Representatives from the Corps, EPA, FWS, National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and [National 
Resources Conservation Service], as appropriate given the projected use for the bank, should typically 
comprise the MBRT. In addition, it is appropriate for representatives from state, tribal and local regulatory 
and resource agencies to participate where an agency has authorities and/or mandates directly affecting 
or affected by the establishment, use or operation of a bank.”), with 33 C.F.R. § 332.2 (“Interagency 
Review Team (IRT) means an interagency group of federal, tribal, state, and/or local regulatory and 
resource agency representatives that reviews documentation for, and advises the district engineer on, the 
establishment and management of a mitigation bank . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
 75 Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. at 
58,610. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Womble & Doyle, supra note 49, at 250. 
 78 “In Fiscal Year 2003, an estimated 60 percent of the compensatory mitigation was provided 
through permittee-responsible compensatory mitigation, 33 percent was provided by mitigation banks, 
and 7 percent was provided by in-lieu fee programs.” U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DEP’T OF THE ARMY, 
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT, AND REGULATORY 
ANALYSIS FOR THE COMPENSATORY MITIGATION REGULATION, at vi (2008) [hereinafter USACE FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT]. 
 79 See Ruhl et al., supra note 38, at 256–57 (discussing how, starting in the late 1990s, researchers 
began publishing a series of articles questioning whether the Section 404 program was adequately taking 
into account how the economics of compensatory mitigation resulted in a translocation of ecological 
functions from urban to rural areas). 
 80  COMM. ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES, supra note 47, at 2. 
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acknowledged the benefits of mitigation banking as compared to PRM, 
including the mitigation activity performed in advance of wetland impacts, 
the pooling of financial resources and scientific expertise for development 
of larger project sites, and the consolidation of compliance monitoring 
efforts.81 In contrast to the benefits of mitigation banking, the report found 
that PRM sites often lacked legal and financial mechanisms for assuring the 
long-term protection of the sites,82 and were less ecologically successful than 
mitigation bank sites.83 While the report did not explicitly announce a 
favored approach, it concluded that “[t]hird-party compensation 
approaches . . . offer some advantages over [PRM].”84 The report 
recommended that “institutional systems be modified to provide third-party 
compensatory mitigation with all of the following attributes: timely and 
assured compensation for all permitted activities, watershed integration, and 
assurances of long-term sustainability and stewardship for the compensatory 
wetlands.”85 
In 2008, the EPA and the Corps jointly issued a Final Rule endorsing 
many of the recommendations from the NRC report.86 The Rule replaced the 
various guidance letters and memoranda governing the compensatory 
mitigation framework with a uniform set of regulations.87 It further applied 
equivalent standards to PRM projects, ILF programs, and mitigation banks; 
for instance, under the Rule, detailed mitigation plans with a consistent set 
of required components must be submitted for all types of mitigation 
projects.88 Acknowledging the benefits of mitigation banks,89 the Rule 
 
 81 See id. at 67–69. 
 82 See id. at 6. 
 83 See id. at 115–16. On-site PRM projects have been challenged as ecologically unsuccessful due to 
the fragmentation and isolation of the wetland sites—with no attempt to link the wetlands to broader 
wetland ecosystems—along with design and engineering failures. See Travis E. Booth, Comment, 
Compensatory Mitigation: What is the Best Approach?, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 212–13 (2004) 
(describing the functional defects of on-site mitigation). 
 84 COMM. ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES, supra note 47, at 9. 
 85 Id. at 164. 
 86 Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594 (Apr. 
10, 2008) (codified at 33 C.F.R. §§ 325, 332, and 40 C.F.R. § 230). 
 87 See Sakyi, supra note 44, at 1034. 
 88 See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 19,597. 
For a more detailed discussion of the mitigation plans required for mitigation banks, see infra Section 
III.A. 
 89 See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 19,604 
(“In many cases, the environmentally preferable compensatory mitigation will be provided through 
mitigation banks . . . because they typically involve consolidating compensatory mitigation projects and 
resources, and providing financial planning and scientific expertise.”). 
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established a hierarchy of preferences for compensatory offset methods, with 
mitigation banking credits first, ILF programs second, and PRM last.90 
In response to the shift in the regulatory regime toward an environment 
that explicitly favors mitigation banking, the number of mitigation banks in 
operation or undergoing the permitting process has increased dramatically 
over the last decade and a half.91 A 2005 Corps inventory estimated there 
were 450 approved mitigation banks in operation;92 by 2010, that number 
had grown to more than 950.93 In August 2013, there were 1800 approved 
mitigation banks listed in the Corps’s Regulatory In Lieu Fee and Bank 
Information Tracking System (RIBITS),94 and by 2015, this number had 
grown to over 2000.95 
As Corps district offices have continued to implement the Final Rule—
and as the number of mitigation banks in geographic markets across the 
country has grown—permittees have shifted away from PRM and toward the 
use of mitigation banks and ILF options to provide compensatory offsets.96 
For instance, in the Corps’s Norfolk District, the percentage of unavoidable 
 
 90 See id. at 19,673–74. 
 91 See Sutter et al., supra note 18, at 49. 
 92 Eric T. Olsen, Wetland Mitigation Banking: An Innovative Practice Grows to a Major Industry 
and Provides an Additional Land Revenue Option, TRENDS, Sept./Oct. 2015, at 13, 14. 
 93 Owley, supra note 51, at 1108. 
 94 HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 6. RIBITS is a publicly accessible database that tracks 
information for approved mitigation banks throughout the United States, including their locations, 
permitting documents, existing credit supplies, and transaction histories. See infra notes 181–82 and 
accompanying text. 
 95 Olsen, supra note 92, at 14. These figures include banks that provide stream mitigation credits. 
See Mitigation Concepts for All USACE Districts, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, 
https://ribits.usace.army.mil/ribits_apex/f?p=107:27:31538576013038::NO::P27_BUTTON_KEY:0 
[https://perma.cc/U3Y5-PW6V] (defining a mitigation bank as “a site where resources (e.g., wetlands, 
streams, riparian areas) are restored, established, enhanced, and/or preserved for the purpose of providing 
compensatory mitigation for impacts authorized by Department of the Army permits”). Stream mitigation 
is analogous to wetland mitigation, with ecological impact of development activity and required 
compensatory offsets generally measured in stream linear feet as opposed to acres. See THE ENVTL. LAW 
INST. & LAND TR. ALL., WETLAND AND STREAM MITIGATION: A HANDBOOK FOR LAND TRUSTS 17 
(2012), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/d22_04.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
Q7SB-7PKF] (“In instances where [more sophisticated assessment methods are unavailable], the Corps 
often use acres (e.g., for wetlands) or linear feet (e.g., for streams) as the tool to quantify or measure 
potential losses at the impact site and potential benefits at the compensation site.”). 
 96 Compare USACE FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 78, at vi (finding that, in 
Fiscal Year 2003, mitigation banks and ILF collectively accounted for a total of 40% of compensatory 
mitigation activity), with INST. FOR WATER RES., THE MITIGATION RULE RETROSPECTIVE: A REVIEW OF 
THE 2008 REGULATIONS GOVERNING COMPENSATORY MITIGATION FOR LOSSES OF AQUATIC 
RESOURCES 11 (2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
11/documents/mitrule_report_october_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZVA-VTCX] (finding that, between 
2010 and 2014, these approaches accounted for 52% of mitigation activity). 
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impacts for which permittees provided compensatory offsets in the form of 
mitigation credits increased from 26% in 2012 to 74% in 2016.97 
An influx of capital investment into bank development has fueled the 
growth of mitigation banking activity, as investors and entrepreneurs have 
flocked to the market with hopes of capturing a share of the estimated $1.3–
$2.2 billion annual market for wetland mitigation credits.98 Large 
institutional investors are among the significant players in the mitigation 
banking space. For instance, between 2008 and 2015, the New Mexico 
Educational Retirement Board, the pension fund for the state’s public-school 
employees, made capital commitments of over $100 million to mitigation 
bank investment funds,99 and in 2014 the fund revised its natural resources 
investment policy to include an allocation to mitigation banking.100 In 2016, 
Ecosystem Investment Partners (EIP), a private equity firm focused on 
investments in environmental offset markets, closed a third round of 
investment for the establishment of mitigation banks with over $300 million 
in capital commitments.101 EIP anticipates the fund will consist of ten to 
fifteen investments on properties ranging in size from 1000 to 30,000 
acres.102 In support of the growing industry, various trade organizations have 
been formed to advocate on behalf of market participants, including 
investors, bank sponsors, consultants, engineers, landowners, and others.103 
 
 97 Mitigation Banks & Banking, TROUT HEADWATERS, INC. (2018), https://create.piktochart. 
com/output/26541638-%E2%80%A2mitigation-banks-and-ecosystem-banking [https://perma.cc/AZ9C-
737M]. 
 98 See Olsen, supra note 92, at 14. 
 99 See N.M. EDUC. RET. BD., MINUTES OF THE NEW MEXICO EDUCATIONAL RETIREMENT BOARD 
INVESTMENT COMMITTEE 8–11 (2008); N.M. EDUC. RET. BD., MINUTES OF THE NEW MEXICO 
EDUCATIONAL RETIREMENT BOARD INVESTMENT COMMITTEE 8–13 (2010); N.M. EDUC. RET. BD., 
ACTION SUMMARY: INVESTMENT COMMITTEE 6–8 (2015) [hereinafter N.M. ERB 2015 MINUTES]. 
 100 See N.M. EDUC. RET. BD., NATURAL RESOURCES INVESTMENT POLICY & PROCEDURES 3–4 
(2014). 
 101 See EIP Closes Fund III with Capital Commitment of $303 Million, supra note 11. The New 
Mexico Educational Retirement Board approved a capital commitment of $50 million to the fund. See 
N.M. ERB 2015 MINUTES, supra note 99. 
 102 See EIP Closes Fund III with Capital Commitment of $303 Million, supra note 11. 
 103 See Kelli Barrett, Big Mitigation Bankers Embrace Role as “Ecological Restoration Businesses”, 
but Smaller Players Feel Sidelined, FOREST TRENDS (June 7, 2017), https://www.forest-
trends.org/ecosystem_marketplace/big-mitigation-bankers-embrace-role-ecological-restoration-
businesses-smaller-players-feel-sidelined [https://perma.cc/YL3T-ECNX]. Two major industry groups 
include the Ecological Restoration Business Association—formerly known as the National Mitigation 
Banking Association—and the National Environmental Banking Association. See id. 
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II. THE DEBATE OVER COMPENSATORY OFFSETS AND THE MITIGATION 
BANKING MARKET 
By issuing the 2008 Final Rule, the agencies charged with overseeing 
federal wetland protection have firmly backed the mitigation banking 
approach to providing compensatory offsets for wetland impacts.104 Many 
scholars and environmentalists, however, remain critical of the desirability 
of promoting efficiency in markets for compensatory offsets,105 and remain 
skeptical of the endorsement of wetland mitigation banking over other 
approaches.106 This Part briefly discusses the arguments that feature 
prominently in these debates, and proposes that a robust, highly developed 
wetland mitigation banking program could address critics’ concerns, making 
mitigation banking a preferred option over other compensatory mitigation 
alternatives. 
A. The Desirability of Promoting Efficiency in Compensatory  
Offset Markets 
Compensatory offsets under the Section 404 regime allow developers 
to move forward with economically beneficial activities, while also 
providing a framework under which the regulatory authorities can ensure that 
overall wetland functionality is not lost as a result of such development. The 
traditional view from the regulatory standpoint is that markets for 
compensatory offsets represent a “win-win”: the market determines a fair 
price that allows for development activity while generating financial returns 
for mitigation activity, and regulatory oversight and the no net loss policy 
ensure that ecological functions are preserved.107 
However, there are numerous challenges to ensuring that the functional 
value of the wetland replacement is commensurate with the wetlands 
destroyed. First, there are large variations in wetland types—the physical 
nature and the species supported can vary significantly, even over short 
distances between coastal and inland areas.108 Moreover, the functions that 
wetlands provide are diverse and dissimilar, making it difficult and 
expensive to make comparisons and evaluate tradeoffs.109 Many mitigation 
 
 104 See supra Section I.C. 
 105 See, e.g., infra notes 108–10 and accompanying text (describing the difficulty of ensuring that 
such offsets adequately replace the destroyed wetland function of the impact area). 
 106 See, e.g., infra notes 119–34 and accompanying text (calling into question the benefits of 
mitigation banking). 
 107 See Murphy et al., supra note 45, at 317. 
 108 See ENVTL. LAW INST., WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING 25 (1993), https://www.eli.org/sites/ 
default/files/eli-pubs/wetland-mitigation-banking.pdf [https://perma.cc/XEB5-AB2B] [hereinafter ELI 
REPORT]. 
 109 Id. at 25–26. 
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banks rely on simple acre-based counting or a narrow accounting of the 
functional value of wetlands, and such approaches cannot capture the true 
tradeoffs between varying types of wetlands.110 
The thrust of these criticisms is that encouraging greater efficiency in 
the use of offset markets results in a net depletion of aquatic resources and 
the functional values they provide. But some of these concerns could be 
reduced as the Corps develops techniques that less expensively and more 
accurately capture the functional value of wetland sites. Moreover, if a 
greater number of wetland banks are established that represent a more 
diverse set of wetland types, the Corps could require permittees to purchase 
credits from mitigation banks with available credits that more accurately 
match the types of wetlands impacted and the watershed functions they 
serve. 
B. Evaluating Regulatory Favored Status for Mitigation Banks 
Another point of contention is whether regulatory authorities should 
explicitly favor mitigation banking over other options for providing 
compensatory offsets, including the traditional PRM approach. Professor 
Royal Gardner, a prolific scholar in the area of wetland law and policy, 
articulates numerous reasons for why mitigation banking is environmentally 
attractive compared to PRM.111 First, because mitigation activity generally 
occurs in advance of the Corps issuing credit to a mitigation bank,112 there is 
less concern from the standpoint of regulators over whether the project will 
be environmentally successful.113 Next, because bank sites consolidate both 
technical and financial resources, a bank sponsor can more easily bring 
together the necessary components to implement a successful mitigation 
project.114 Finally, larger bank sites may provide more ecological value as 
compared to mitigation provided on a project-by-project basis.115 
Environmental law practitioners Robert Sokolove and Pamela Huang 
also point to the practical considerations of regulating compensatory offsets 
 
 110 Dustin J. Edwards, Comment, Wetland Mitigation Banking: Is the Current System Beyond 
Repair?, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 445, 458–59 (2003) (discussing the inadequacy of the acre-based and 
functional assessment methods for valuing wetlands and arguing for the development of a “refined 
currency” that “accurately pinpoint[s] the value sought to be measured”). 
 111 See Royal C. Gardner, Money for Nothing? The Rise of Wetland Fee Mitigation, 19 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1, 5–13 (2000). 
 112 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 113 See Gardner, supra note 111, at 9. 
 114 See id. at 9–10. 
 115 See id. at 10. 
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in favoring the use of large wetland bank sites.116 Specifically, “the 
development of larger regional mitigation banks provides the opportunity for 
the environmental community and regulatory agencies to focus their review 
efforts on fewer, less scattered wetland projects.”117 In response to claims 
that “a large bank ‘failure’ will have a greater impact than the loss of smaller, 
dispersed wetlands created for mitigation purposes,” they suggest that such 
critics overestimate the likelihood of such failures in light of the ability of 
regulatory agencies to consolidate their oversight efforts.118 
These arguments notwithstanding, some critics argue that some of the 
theoretical benefits of mitigation banking are not fully realized in practice. 
For instance, attorneys for the National Wildlife Federation point out that 
mitigation banks sell nearly all their credits before wetland restoration is 
considered complete and successful, and many credits are sold before 
restoration even begins, thereby negating part of the temporal benefit of 
wetland banks.119 Releasing some credits before wetland restoration is 
complete may be unavoidable in order to incentivize investment;120 however, 
Corps districts could enforce more stringent rules around the timing of credit 
releases relative to restoration, or at least relative to the recording of a 
conservation easement that ensures the land will be protected in perpetuity, 
regardless of the successful implementation of a mitigation site.121 Moreover, 
because most credit releases are contingent upon achievement of successful 
site construction122 and achievement of performance goals,123 mitigation 
banking continues to offer the temporal benefit that PRM and ILF 
approaches lack.124 
 
 116 See Robert D. Sokolove & Pamela D. Huang, Privatization of Wetland Mitigation Banking, 
7 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 36 (1992). 
 117 Id. at 38. 
 118 See id. 
 119 Murphy et al., supra note 45, at 317; see also WASH. CREDIT GUIDE, supra note 9, at 8 n.9 (stating 
that “up to 14% of the total potential credits for the bank may be released at pre-construction”). 
 120 See HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 9 (describing how “as much as 75 to 93 percent of total 
costs for a bank—including costs for land acquisition, legal work, and bank construction and design”––
is required “years in advance of realizing any returns,” and suggesting that bank sponsors should mitigate 
this risk by “seek[ing] to permit the mitigation bank and begin[ning] to sell credits after recording of a 
conservation easement”). 
 121 See id. at 20. 
 122 See WASH. CREDIT GUIDE, supra note 9, at 8 n.10 (stating that “up to 30% of the total potential 
credits for the bank may be released when the bank is constructed and the IRT approve the as-built”). 
 123 See id. at 8 n.11 (stating that “up to 50% of the total potential credits for the bank may be released 
when the hydrologic performance standard(s) has been attained”). 
 124 See HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 20 (“Some entrepreneurs argue that a partial issuance of 
credits at the early stages of a bank is still superior to the greater temporal loss that would occur through 
ILF and PRM mitigation methods.”). 
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Another argument against mitigation banks—and in favor of PRM—is 
that off-site banks cannot match the ecological value compared to on-site 
mitigation projects.125 The location of a wetland is integral to the value it 
provides; for instance, a wetland may provide effective habitat for bird 
migration or flood control for a nearby community in part because of its 
location.126 Developers engaging in PRM projects may perform mitigation 
work “on-site,”127 meaning the mitigation activity occurs on “an area located 
on the same parcel of land as the impact site, or on a parcel of land contiguous 
to the impact site.”128 In contrast, mitigation banks provide off-site 
mitigation,129 meaning the mitigation activity is “neither located on the same 
parcel of land as the impact site, nor on a parcel of land contiguous to the 
parcel containing the impact site.”130 
University of Maryland researcher Curtis Bohlen argues that reliance 
on mitigation banks would “lead to an altered spatial distribution of wetlands 
across the landscape,” and that “an on-site bias . . . makes eminent sense.”131 
However, because development activity may alter hydrological conditions at 
the impact site, the effectiveness of on-site mitigation may be weakened.132 
It is for this reason the National Research Council rejected an automatic 
preference for on-site mitigation and instead favored a “watershed” approach 
that considers compensation for wetland functions across larger, 
hydrologically defined geographical areas.133 A mitigation banking program 
that adheres to such a watershed approach can therefore be more effective in 
compensating for losses of wetland functions than on-site PRM projects. 
In summary, while critics have raised important arguments against 
mitigation banking, an appropriately administered mitigation banking 
regime offers more regulatory certainty of successful ecological uplift to 
compensate for development activity compared to the alternatives. 
Moreover, by encouraging the creation of more mitigation banks, regulators 
can enforce stricter rules with respect to the type and location of permissible 
offsets, ensuring that the credits that developers purchase truly represent an 
uplift that provides ecological value of a similar type and location compared 
to the development activity. 
 
 125 See Murphy et al., supra note 45, at 317–18; CURTIS C. BOHLEN, LANDSCAPE CHANGE AND THE 
ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF MITIGATION BANKS 10–11 (EPA Publication No. 230-R-96-008, 1996). 
 126 ELI REPORT, supra note 108, at 30. 
 127 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(b)(5) (2017). 
 128 Id. § 332.2. 
 129 See COMM. ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES, supra note 47, at 67. 
 130 33 C.F.R. § 332.2. 
 131 BOHLEN, supra note 125, at 10–11. 
 132 See COMM. ON MITIGATING WETLAND LOSSES, supra note 47, at 4. 
 133 See id. at 67. 
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III. COSTS AND RISKS OF INVESTING IN WETLAND MITIGATION BANKS 
According to a 1993 report by the Environmental Law Institute (ELI), 
“[c]ost and uncertainty appear to be the biggest impediments to widespread 
use of mitigation banks.”134 Although the regulatory regime has evolved 
significantly in the twenty-five years since the ELI published its report, this 
statement still rings true today. An investor who decides to enter the 
mitigation banking market must balance the potential for lucrative credit 
sales against the high costs associated with establishing a mitigation banking 
site—and the sources of risk that accompany the unique form of investment. 
Additionally, due to the peculiar structure of the market and the regulatory 
regime, even a sophisticated investor who has performed significant research 
and analysis may lack important pieces of information when making upfront 
investment decisions, such as acquiring control of a parcel of land for hosting 
a bank site and engaging resources to develop detailed mitigation plans. This 
Part describes the costs and risks associated with investing in a wetland 
mitigation banking site. 
A. Costs of Establishing a Wetland Mitigation Bank 
The costs required to enter the mitigation banking market, even on a 
small parcel of land, can be quite significant. Time and effort are required to 
perform upfront due diligence on geographic market and site suitability,135 
and scientific expertise is required for developing detailed site mitigation 
plans.136 Bank sponsors must engage in a lengthy negotiation process with 
regulatory authorities to secure the mitigation banking instrument (MBI) 
required to operate the bank.137 Labor and materials are also needed to 
construct the mitigation site. Finally, the bank sponsor must provide for 
ongoing monitoring and maintenance and must establish financial 
assurances to ensure the site’s long-term viability for providing wetland 
functions.138 
 
 134 ELI REPORT, supra note 108, at 23. 
 135 See HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 8. 
 136 See id. at 16; see also Starting a Wetland Mitigation Bank: What You Need to Know, WIS. DEP’T 
OF NAT. RES., http://dnr.wi.gov/topic/Wetlands/documents/mitigation/ 
StartingAWetlandMitigationBank.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XDX-7CJN] (“[Bank sponsors] typically work 
with a qualified consultant knowledgeable in wetland ecology and restoration to plan and implement 
restoration activities.”). 
 137 See id. (“The timeline from submitting a [proposal document] to having an approved MBI often 
takes 1 to 2 years.”). 
 138 The initial capital outlay for land acquisition, permitting, design, and construction may be as much 
as 75%–93% of the total costs of the bank. HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 9. However, some Corps 
districts provide credit releases prior to the start of physical construction as certain administrative hurdles, 
such as the signing of the MBI, are cleared. See, e.g., WASH. CREDIT GUIDE, supra note 9, at 8. Bank 
sponsors can use the proceeds from these early credit releases to fund site construction activity, and all 
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To start the planning process, a prospective bank sponsor must first 
identify if a specific geographic market is appropriate for market entry. 
Under the 2008 Final Rule, mitigation banks may only sell credits to 
permittees causing wetland impacts within defined geographic service 
areas.139 These service areas may take the form of Hydrologic Unit Code 
(HUC) watersheds, the boundaries of which are defined by the U.S. 
Geological Survey.140 The prospective bank sponsor must analyze the 
amount of anticipated Section 404 permitting activity within the service 
area—a function of not only the service area’s size and existing wetland 
stock, but also the amount of anticipated development activity, such as the 
building of roads and bridges, residential communities, retail stores, utility 
lines, and gas pipelines141—expected to cause unavoidable wetland 
impacts.142 Additionally, the prospective bank sponsor must determine 
whether the price she can expect to receive from the credit sales supports the 
significant investment—while some market entrants may be able to rely on 
relationships with industry participants to ascertain market price 
information,143 such information may be inaccessible to others or only 
available for purchase from a limited commercial database.144 
Once a market is deemed suitable, the prospective bank sponsor must 
locate a parcel of land (if she does not already control one) and perform due 
 
credit sales can fund ongoing monitoring and maintenance activities in addition to providing required 
financial assurances. See Mark Laska, 12 Steps to Successful Wetlands Mitigation Banking, ENVTL. 
PROTECTION (Apr. 18, 2008), https://eponline.com/Articles/2008/04/18/12-Steps-to-Successful-
Wetlands-Mitigation-Banking [https://perma.cc/56C3-KBPQ]. Moreover, bank sponsors can complete 
bank construction over various phases—receiving credits from the completed portions as they achieve 
performance standards—and then use proceeds from the sales of these initially released credits to fund 
construction of the bank’s subsequent phases. See HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 9. 
 139 Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 
19,682 (Apr. 10, 2008) (codified at 33 C.F.R. §§ 325, 332, and 40 C.F.R. § 230) (“The service area must 
be appropriately sized to ensure that the aquatic resources provided will effectively compensate for 
adverse environmental impacts across the entire service area.”). 
 140 The HUC classification system divides the country into numeric drainage areas that become 
increasingly more specific and spatially narrow as digits are added. See Womble & Doyle, supra note 49, 
at 268–79. The most commonly used definition of a mitigation bank’s service area bank is an eight-digit 
HUC (HUC-8), a classification used by twenty-five of thirty-eight Corps districts. See id. at 281. Some 
Corps districts allow permittees to buy mitigation credits from so-called “secondary service areas”—
generally adjacent HUC-6 or HUC-8 watersheds—if no credits are available in the immediate watershed. 
See id. 
 141 See HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 5. 
 142 For a more detailed discussion of determination of geographic service areas and implications for 
mitigation banking activity, see Womble & Doyle, supra note 49, at 268–79. 
 143 See HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 13. 
 144 See, e.g., Mitigation Credit Price Report (MCPR), supra note 1 (offering paid access to a 
“Mitigation Credit Price Report” (MCPR) providing sales price records for wetland credits, among other 
types of compensatory mitigation credits, in various regions across the United States). 
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diligence to ensure the site is suitable for development of a wetland 
mitigation bank. Formerly drained or degraded wetlands often serve as 
effective sites for wetland restoration—such land generally has 
characteristics that can support wetland functions, and proven techniques 
utilized for wetland restoration projects generally have higher success rates 
compared to wetland creation and enhancement projects.145 The amount of 
credits a bank receives is generally a function of the amount of ecological 
uplift the bank sponsor is able to create at the bank site.146 The process of 
evaluating site suitability may involve engaging environmental consultants 
and engineers to perform an analysis of the existing and historic wetland 
classifications and of soil types to determine if a prospective mitigation 
project stands a significant chance of generating ecological uplift that will 
result in credits.147 
Under the Rule, a bank sponsor must generate a detailed mitigation plan 
that contains twelve fundamental components: “objectives; site selection 
criteria; site protection instruments (e.g., conservation easements); baseline 
information . . . ; credit determination methodology; mitigation work plan; 
maintenance plan; ecological performance standards; monitoring 
requirements; long-term management plan; adaptive management plan; and 
financial assurances.”148 These mitigation plans generally involve detailed 
descriptions of the design and engineering work that will be required to 
construct the site—such as land-moving, planting, and building structures 
for habitat—and developing these plans generally requires the help of 
experts.149 The plans then undergo rigorous evaluation by the Interagency 
 
 145 See MITIGATION BANKING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 264 (Lindell L. Marsh et al. eds., 1996); see 
also Wetland Mitigation Banks: An Option to Consider, supra note 4 (“Historically, many wetlands have 
been drained through the installation of ditches and tiles and converted to farmlands. Such farmlands 
make ideal wetland mitigation banks because they are typically large enough to justify the effort, and 
hydrology can be restored to its natural state.”). 
 146 See, e.g., WASH. CREDIT GUIDE, supra note 9, at 2 (“Credits are the trading medium that is used 
to represent the ecological gains at a bank site. The gains are typically considered in terms of the lift in 
functions for wetlands . . . that are expected to result from the types of activities implemented at the bank 
site.”). 
 147 While expensive on-site inspections may be required, there is an increasing number of online 
resources in the form of geospatial tools that allow this analysis to be performed remotely and more 
cheaply. See, e.g., Tools for Evaluating Feasibility of Restoration, ENVTL. LAW INST., https://www.eli. 
org/freshwater-ocean/tools-evaluating-feasibility-restoration [https://perma.cc/Z6TL-GTDK] (listing 
several such tools). 
 148 Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 
19,616 (Apr. 10, 2008) (codified at 33 C.F.R. §§ 325, 332, and 40 C.F.R. § 230). 
 149 Laska, supra note 138. 
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Review Team (IRT), a process that can take several years.150 The IRT has the 
authority to negotiate the terms and grant final approval of the MBI.151 
The MBI outlines, among other information, the number of credits a 
proposed bank site is eligible to generate, the performance standards the bank 
needs to meet before credits will be released to the bank for sale to 
developers, and the geographic service area for which credits generated by 
the bank can be sold.152 Performance standards typically include factors such 
as wetland hydrology and acreage, vegetation coverage and density, and 
wildlife habitat.153 Guidance documents from some Corps district offices 
indicate that it typically takes ten to twelve years before all available credits 
are released to a bank.154 
Once the IRT-participating agencies sign the MBI, the bank sponsor 
performs the construction activity necessary to create the wetland site in 
accordance with the plan set forth in the MBI. Construction work often 
involves grading work such as moving soils and fill material, planting native 
species sourced from local seed stock, and building structures to create 
habitat for local wildlife.155 After construction is complete, the bank sponsor 
must continue to maintain and monitor the site to ensure that it meets the 
ecological performance goals as defined in the MBI.156 After the bank meets 
all performance criteria and receives and sells all available wetland credits, 
the bank sponsor must transfer the land, along with a long-term management 
fund, to a steward—often a nonprofit conservancy—which assumes 
responsibility for the long-term management of the bank site.157 
B. Sources of Risk 
In addition to the significant costs, prospective bank sponsors face 
myriad risks in the successful implementation and operation of a wetland 
 
 150 See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 
19,698; supra note 137 and accompanying text; see also HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 11. 
 151 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 152 See Laska, supra note 138; Olsen, supra note 92, at 13. 
 153 See WASH. CREDIT GUIDE, supra note 9, at 8. Credits may also be released to the bank as certain 
administrative hurdles are passed, such as the signing of the MBI itself, the recording of a conservation 
easement encumbering the land, and the posting of financial assurances. See id. 
 154 See id. at 2. 
 155 Laska, supra note 138. 
 156 See generally Sherry Teresa, Perpetual Stewardship Considerations for Compensatory 
Mitigation and Mitigation Banks, 38 STETSON L. REV. 337 (2009) (describing the long-term stewardship 
responsibilities associated with mitigation banks and explaining that “[u]nder the new Mitigation Rules, 
all compensatory mitigation projects and banks must have a long-term funding mechanism to ensure 
minimal compliance with the long-term protection instrument and an annual reporting of the financial 
assurances and account balances”). 
 157 See WASH. CREDIT GUIDE, supra note 9, at 9. 
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mitigation bank. These risks can be classified into four categories: legal, 
regulatory, performance, and market risks. 
First, legal risks are those posed by potential changes to the Clean Water 
Act and its jurisdiction that could dismantle or significantly undermine the 
compensatory mitigation program overall. For instance, Congress could do 
away with or substantially alter the Section 404 permitting process so as to 
disallow off-site compensatory offsets for wetland impacts. Alternatively, 
Congress, the courts, or executive agencies could significantly narrow the 
jurisdictional reach of the “waters of the United States” under the CWA, thus 
drying up a significant amount of credit demand.158 However, as the 
mitigation banking market matures and large investors enter the mitigation 
banking space, it may become less likely that such major policy changes will 
occur—one regulator even suggested that there likely will not be a rule 
change as dramatic as the Final Rule again.159 
Second, regulatory risks involve the possibility that a mitigation bank 
could face delays or underperformance due to the actions of the local Corps 
office or other members of the IRT in permitting or overseeing the bank. 
Bank sponsors may encounter delays in the permitting process due to the 
ongoing negotiation with IRT members.160 These negotiations could result in 
a bank being awarded fewer credits, a slower credit release schedule, or a 
smaller geographic service area compared to what the bank sponsor initially 
anticipated when deciding to pursue the mitigation project.161 Moreover, not 
all Corps districts have fully implemented the Final Rule evenly—a 2013 
report indicated that several Corps districts allow or prefer PRM or ILF 
alternatives to mitigation bank credits, or require a permittee purchasing 
credits from a mitigation bank to account for more compensatory mitigation 
acres per acre of wetland loss compared to using other options, making 
mitigation banking less attractive to the permittee.162 Such actions could 
weaken the demand for credits, thereby depressing the financial returns a 
bank sponsor receives on her investment in the mitigation bank.163 
Third, there are performance risks related to the achievement of the 
bank. The bank site itself may fail to develop the hydrological or biological 
functions as anticipated in the MBI, and natural disasters may cause damage 
 
 158 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 159 See HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 13. 
 160 See id. at 10–11. 
 161 See id. at 11. 
 162 See id. at 12. 
 163 Notably, should a Corps district require a permittee to account for more compensatory mitigation 
when choosing the mitigation banking option, and the permittee proceeds with purchasing the credits over 
the PRM and ILF options, this could increase the demand for credits and could enhance the bank 
sponsor’s financial returns. 
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to the bank site, leading to delays in the achievement of performance 
standards.164 There could also be failures in the design, construction, or 
project management of the bank site.165 Such occurrences could result in a 
failure of the bank to receive credits on the timeline or of the volume initially 
anticipated, thus depressing financial returns. 
Finally, market risks include the possibility that a bank sponsor will be 
unable to successfully market the credits to permittees or capture the credit 
prices she anticipated in funding the bank development project. The risk of 
credit prices deviating from expectations is one of the most significant risks 
a bank sponsor faces.166 Deviations in credit price forecasts could be caused 
by changes in the local demand or supply of credits: worsening 
macroeconomic conditions could lead to a slowing of development activity, 
or a competing bank may open within the same watershed, resulting in 
unanticipated price competition for credits.167 While this form of market risk 
is not unique to mitigation banking, the risk is magnified by the fact that 
there are fewer historical credit transactions off of which to base prices,168 
and, as will be discussed in the next Part, credit price information is generally 
opaque. Therefore, prospective bank sponsors often lack a clear 
understanding of the financial returns they could receive for establishing a 
mitigation bank in a geographic service area for which they lack first-hand 
knowledge of historical credit transactions. 
While strategies exist for mitigating several of the risks described in 
this Section,169 access to credit price information, which forms the basis for 
predicting revenues from credit sales, is critical for addressing market risk. 
For some large investors, a plausible solution for mitigating this risk would 
be to partner with active market participants170 who have better access to 
 
 164 See HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 16–17. 
 165 See id. at 16. 
 166 See id. at 13. 
 167 As discussed in Section IV.B, infra, a prospective bank sponsor can research information about 
competing banks using the Corps’s RIBITS database. However, the database can take up to twenty-four 
months to list information about new mitigation bank projects. See HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 14. 
This lapse in time contributes to the risk that a prospective bank sponsor could underestimate the 
competition for wetland credits in a given service area. 
 168 See HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 14. 
 169 See id. at 18 (summarizing risks to the bank sponsor and mitigants). 
 170 An example would be the New Mexico Educational Retirement Board’s capital commitments of 
over $100 million to mitigation bank investment funds managed by Ecosystem Investment Partners (EIP) 
between 2008 and 2015. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. EIP is a leading private equity firm 
in the wetland mitigation banking space. Aligning Ecological & Financial Returns, ECOSYSTEM INV. 
PARTNERS, https://ecosystempartners. 
com/about-our-environmental-investing-and-mitigation-credits [https://perma.cc/GQ6K-FTJT]. EIP’s 
website boasts 28,975 acres of wetland restoration experience as of 2018. Id. 
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market price information171—this strategy, along with the possibility for 
significant financial returns, could explain the substantial influx of 
institutional investment in the mitigation banking space in recent years.172 
However, for some prospective bank sponsors who lack such sources of 
information, the uncertainty associated with credit prices may be so great 
that they may be dissuaded from entering the market altogether. The next 
Part discusses how public reporting of credit prices could reduce the market 
risk for prospective bank sponsors, thereby encouraging more market entry 
and leading to a more efficient market for wetland credits. 
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF CREDIT PRICE INFORMATION IN CREATING MORE 
EFFICIENT MARKETS FOR WETLAND CREDITS 
Improvements can be made to the administration of the mitigation 
banking program so that prospective bank sponsors are able to make more 
informed investment decisions. Specifically, transparency of credit prices 
would reduce the uncertainty prospective bank sponsors face concerning 
entry into the mitigation banking market, which would encourage more 
market entry. Historical credit price information, however, is generally not 
reported; many prospective bank sponsors who lack requisite connections 
within the local market are forced to engage in cloak-and-dagger tactics to 
ascertain the information from existing banks operating within the service 
area––and even then, such information may be unreliable.173 This Part first 
discusses the importance of access to credit price information and the 
deficiencies in how the Corps currently handles credit price information, and 
then argues that the Corps should collect and publish credit price 
information. 
A. Credit Price Transparency and Market Entry 
Credit prices send important signals to the market for wetland 
compensatory mitigation. Adam Davis, a conservation finance consultant, 
 
 171 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 172 See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text. 
 173 Many mitigation banks do not publicly advertise the prices of their available credits. See, e.g., 
Mitigation to Help Restore & Protect Louisiana’s Wetlands, CALCASIEU PINE SAVANNA WETLAND 
MITIGATION BANK, http://calcasieubank.com [https://perma.cc/A6NV-65RV] (advertising credits for a 
Louisiana mitigation bank owned and operated by EIP and providing contact information to purchase 
credits). Because an active mitigation bank would be unlikely to voluntarily divulge credit price 
information to a potential competitor, a prospective bank sponsor may have to falsely present herself to 
an existing mitigation bank as a potential developer (i.e., a purchaser of credits) in order to get a credit 
price quote. Moreover, without offering credible evidence that she is a potential developer, the 
prospective bank sponsor may receive inaccurate or misleading price information from the existing 
mitigation bank. 
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argues that for developers, the price of compensatory mitigation represents 
the true cost that the impact poses by depriving the local environment of the 
ecological functions the wetlands provide.174 Using credit price information, 
developers can incorporate the cost of unavoidable impacts to wetlands into 
project economics to determine whether to move forward or to consider 
alternative sites.175 Extrapolating from Davis’s argument, a lower credit price 
could indicate that wetland resources within the watershed are abundant—
perhaps because multiple mitigation banks with available credit are 
operating, and these sites have restored or created the desired ecological 
benefits—and the developer can proceed with the contemplated project less 
expensively. On the other hand, a higher credit price could indicate that 
wetland resources within the watershed are scarce, and the developer should 
consider relocating the project to a watershed where credit prices are lower. 
Likewise, Davis argues that, from the perspective of a prospective bank 
sponsor, wetland credit prices offer information regarding the benefit that a 
unit of protection and restoration provides.176 Following Davis’s argument, a 
high credit price relative to the cost of restoration activity177 indicates that 
the watershed is in need of a greater amount of restoration activity, thereby 
encouraging a prospective bank sponsor to proceed with the establishment 
of a bank site. A low credit price relative to restoration costs, on the other 
hand, indicates that the level of existing wetland protection is sufficient and 
that the prospective bank sponsor should seek a different geographic market 
in which to pursue the restoration activity. 
This logic extends to landowners who are considering entering the 
mitigation banking market. For instance, consider a landowner of a large 
agricultural tract, a portion of which has soils that render it poor for 
agricultural production. The landowner may make decisions regarding land 
use based on credit price information. If prevailing prices for mitigation 
credits are high, the opportunity for the landowner to become a bank sponsor 
by converting the unproductive portion of the tract into a wetland mitigation 
bank site becomes more attractive. On the other hand, a lower credit price 
could indicate that the landowner should maintain that portion of the tract in 
agricultural production or should seek an alternative land use altogether. The 
 
 174 See Adam I. Davis, Ecosystem Services and the Value of Land, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
339, 351 (2010). Davis is also a managing partner for Ecosystem Investment Partners, a private equity 
firm active in the mitigation banking space. The Environmental Investment A-Team, ECOSYSTEM INV. 
PARTNERS, https://ecosystempartners.com/team [https://perma.cc/43HX-JH6Q]. 
 175 See Davis, supra note 174, at 351. 
 176 See id. 
 177 For a discussion of the costs of creating a wetland mitigation bank site and generating credits, see 
supra Section III.A. 
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price allows the landowner to make a more informed decision regarding 
market entry. 
Access to price information could allow for more productive 
negotiations amongst market participants. Using information of credit prices 
from different mitigation banks within a given area, developers could 
negotiate more effectively with existing bank sponsors. Additionally, this 
information would allow a prospective bank sponsor to “pre-sell” credits to 
developers with future anticipated credit needs; having such agreements in 
place would allow the prospective bank sponsor to plan bank development 
more effectively.178 
Aside from simply knowing the prevailing price, historical credit price 
information can be valuable to both developers and prospective bank 
sponsors to understand market trends. Historical prices could allow 
developers to perform more robust due diligence to understand in which 
markets development is becoming more or less expensive, which could be 
important in industries that feature phased development projects. Potential 
bank sponsors would be able to identify historical price trends of credits in 
specific regions and could use this information to construct more accurate 
predictions of future credit prices on which to base their own financial 
projections. 
Historical price information does not determine future prices, and due 
to the time lag between permitting a bank and the sale of credits, bank 
sponsors would still be required to forecast future credit prices. Historical 
price information, however, still provides prospective bank sponsors with a 
valuable starting point for modeling financial returns, and therefore reduces 
some uncertainty associated with market entry. This encourages more market 
entry by prospective bank sponsors, particularly those who otherwise lack 
partnerships with established players. With more mitigation banks opening, 
a higher volume of available credits could further reduce market risk by 
making prices more predictable and less volatile.179 
B. Opacity of Credit Price Information 
One of the peculiar features of the mitigation banking market is that, 
although understanding credit prices is essential to choosing an appropriate 
 
 178 See HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 14 (“A mitigant to the risk of forecasting future prices 
incorrectly is to pre-sell credits in advance of project development and entitlement. As one regulator 
indicated, while such pre-selling occurs, regulators have no influence on the practice, as any risk of the 
bank failing entitlement that would thus negate any pre-sold credits, is borne by entrepreneurs and buyers 
of advance credits.”). 
 179 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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market for entry,180 credit price information is incredibly difficult to ascertain 
for those not involved in or well-connected to the existing market. The 
primary resource that prospective bank sponsors use to research markets is 
the Corps’s RIBITS database.181 Within RIBITS, prospective bank sponsors 
can locate existing banks sited within various watersheds, access their 
mitigation banking instruments (MBIs) and other permitting documents, 
analyze their existing credit supplies, and review their transaction 
histories.182 But one of the most important pieces of information relevant to 
prospective bank sponsors and developers is missing—the prices at which 
the existing banks sold their credits in the past. 
A review of mitigation banking policies from Corps district offices 
demonstrates that price information is generally not even collected from 
bank sponsors within the existing reporting process. For instance, guidance 
from the Corps’s Seattle District office lists information that bank sponsors 
must report when credits are sold.183 This information includes the person or 
organization making the credit purchase, the location of impact, and the 
number of credits sold. Price information, however, is not collected. Instead, 
the guidance indicates that “[a]pplicants interested in purchasing credits 
should speak directly to the bank sponsor to determine credit price and sale 
process.”184 An interagency coordination agreement from the Corps’s 
Chicago District office requires that a bank sponsor complete and submit a 
credit sales form confirming each transaction made to qualified buyers of 
mitigation credits, and maintain an accurate ledger of available credits.185 
However, neither the form nor the ledger includes fields for reporting price 
information.186 
Because credit price information is neither collected nor published, only 
direct participants—that is, current sponsors of mitigation banks and 
permittees who purchased credits from them—generally know actual credit 
prices in a given service area.187 As part of their due diligence efforts, 
prospective bank sponsors can rely on relationships with industry 
 
 180 See supra Section IV.A. 
 181 See RIBITS: Regulatory In-lieu Fee and Bank Information Tracking System, U.S. ARMY CORPS 
OF ENG’RS, https://ribits.usace.army.mil [https://perma.cc/AX9J-64A4]. 
 182 Id. 
 183 See WASH. CREDIT GUIDE, supra note 9, at 13. 
 184 See id. at 12. 
 185 See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AGREEMENT ON MITIGATION 
BANKING WITHIN REGULATORY BOUNDARIES OF CHICAGO DISTRICT 19–20 (2008). 
 186 See id. at 36–37. 
 187 See HOOK & SHADLE, supra note 3, at 13. 
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participants,188 a circumstance that naturally favors those who are already 
connected to the mitigation banking industry. Another option would be for a 
prospective bank sponsor to masquerade as a potential permittee and inquire 
about prices from an existing banker—however, unless a potential permittee 
puts forth sufficient evidence of being a credible buyer, an existing bank 
sponsor may be naturally incentivized to underquote the actual price to stave 
off potential competition. As a result, prospective bank sponsors who do not 
have industry connections often lack vital information needed to make an 
informed decision of whether to enter the market. 
Because mitigation banking is an effective way of providing 
compensatory offsets for wetland impacts,189 the Corps should encourage 
more participation in the mitigation banking market by collecting credit price 
information and publishing it. This information would encourage more 
market entry—particularly by prospective bank sponsors who lack 
connections to the market—and would lead to a deeper pool of active 
mitigation banks.190 
It is true that there are numerous other markets with opaque pricing for 
which no government entity collects and provides price information. 
However, two important characteristics make the market for wetland 
mitigation credits unique and underscore the desirability of increasing 
market transparency: (1) the government’s role in overseeing the market and 
the credit transactions, and (2) a market structure that stands to benefit from 
increased participation of landowners in diverse geographies. 
First, the existence of the wetland mitigation banking market—in 
particular, the supply and demand of credits—is entirely the creation of 
wetland protection legislation and its implementing regulations.191 While 
laws and regulations give rise to other markets as well,192 the government has 
a unique hand in overseeing individual credit transactions, which are 
intended to satisfy Section 404 permitting requirements.193 Because of the 
government’s unique role and its interest in administering the wetland 
mitigation banking regime, the government should play a greater role in 
improving market efficiency by collecting price information and publishing 
it. 
 
 188 See id. (“Credits prices in the present can be estimated through due diligence efforts, such as 
relying on relationships with industry participants in a given region.”). 
 189 See supra Part II. 
 190 See supra Section IV.A. 
 191 See supra Part I. 
 192 To name just a few examples, criminal statutes give rise to markets for legal defense services, 
and the tax code creates demand for accounting services. 
 193 See supra Part I; see also infra Section IV.C (discussing how the Final Rule requires bank 
sponsors to notify the Corps of credit transactions). 
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Second, the mitigation banking market, which becomes more efficient 
as the number of mitigation banks increases,194 stands to benefit from 
participation by landowners in diverse geographies who, in the absence of 
mandatory price reporting, may lack access to price information. Many other 
opaque markets, such as markets for professional services (e.g., consulting, 
legal, and accounting work), are only realistically available for market entry 
by a relatively small number of highly sophisticated actors—there is thus a 
plausible economic argument that the ability to accurately determine market 
prices for such services is a proxy for the ability to perform the services 
themselves. In contrast, the mitigation banking market features geographic 
limitations on selling credits, and operation of a mitigation bank is 
inextricably tied to individual pieces of land. These market features make it 
particularly desirable that mitigation banking occurs in varied places by 
different landowners—many of whom may lack connections to active 
market participants with price information. Therefore, it is particularly 
important that price information is available to inform market entry by 
smaller, geographically dispersed players. 
Some might argue that revealing credit price information would harm 
certain parties, and thus it should not be disclosed. For example, current 
mitigation banks may have made the decision to enter the market under the 
assumption that they would not have to reveal credit prices; by forcing them 
to disclose credit prices, these parties would likely face more price 
competition from parties entering the market. Consequently, falling credit 
prices may result in a lower return on investment than they initially 
anticipated.195 However, because it would likely take bank sponsors entering 
the market several years to operationalize new mitigation banks,196 existing 
bank sponsors would continue to enjoy a relatively undisturbed market for 
credits for some time. 
C. Regulatory Authority and Burden 
In order for credit price information to be made available to the public, 
local Corps districts overseeing mitigation banks would have to begin 
collecting such information from bank sponsors. This would be permissible 
under the current law and regulations, as neither the text of Section 404 of 
the CWA nor the language of the 2008 Final Rule precludes the collection 
and reporting of credit prices. First, Section 404 references “all the 
 
 194 See supra Section II.B. 
 195 In fact, the presence of industry groups advocating on behalf of bank sponsors—and the influence 
these groups exert on the regulatory community—could plausibly explain why the market has remained 
rather opaque with respect to credit price information. 
 196 See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
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information required to complete an application for a permit,” but does not 
provide any details as to what information is required.197 Instead, the statute 
leaves permitting conditions subject to “guidelines developed by the 
Administrator [of the EPA], in conjunction with the Secretary [of the Army, 
acting through the Chief of the Corps].”198 In other words, the statute leaves 
conditions of receiving a permit, including the information that must be 
reported, to the discretion of the EPA and the Corps. Notably, while they do 
have the discretion, either the EPA or the Corps would need to actively 
exercise it—possibly against the will of the existing market players and 
lobbying interests—to begin collecting such information. 
The Final Rule lays out basic reporting requirements for mitigation 
banks that may be heightened by individual Corps districts. The Rule 
requires that “[e]ach time an approved credit transaction occurs, the sponsor 
must notify the district engineer.”199 The Rule also requires bank sponsors to 
maintain and submit to the district engineer an annual ledger showing the 
balance of available credits and all additions and subtractions of credits.200 
Additionally, the Rule notes that it “addresses the minimum requirements for 
ledgers,” and that “[d]istrict engineers can develop ledger templates for use 
in their districts.”201 Since the Rule only lays out the minimum requirements, 
credit price information could be included. 
In summary, nothing in the language of Section 404 or the Final Rule 
would prohibit individual Corps district offices from requiring bank sponsors 
to report credit prices at the time of the transaction, along with the 
notification already required by the Rule. Alternatively, the Corps district 
offices could require that prices be incorporated into the annual ledger, as 
the Rule leaves it to the discretion of district engineers to develop the ledger 
template. At the same time, the Rule does not provide any language that 
would make the collection and reporting of credit price information 
mandatory across Corps districts. Without an amendment to the Rule,202 it 
would be left up to the individual Corps district offices to determine whether 
to require this information from bank sponsors by inserting price reporting 
requirements into MBIs. 
 
 197 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012). 
 198 Id. § 1344(b). 
 199 Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 19,594, 
19,686 (Apr. 10, 2008) (codified at 33 C.F.R. §§ 325, 332, and 40 C.F.R. § 230). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 19,663. 
 202 Such an amendment would require a public notice and comment period under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
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Some may be concerned about the burden that the collection of credit 
prices would impose on local Corps districts. After all, local Corps districts 
have been characterized as “grossly understaffed.”203 As previously noted, 
however, bank sponsors are already required to submit notification of all 
credit sales to the Corps and maintain annual ledgers with accounting 
information to be made available to the IRT.204 The forms and ledgers 
associated with these reporting functions could simply be amended to add 
fields for credit prices. Moreover, the Corps already has a robust reporting 
platform in the RIBITS database,205 allowing users access to the complete 
transaction history for mitigation banks across the country. The information 
in the database could be modified to provide users with historical 
information about credits both for individual banks and in the aggregate 
across watersheds. Overall, it stands to reason that there would be only 
incremental, if any, administrative burden to collect credit price information 
from bank sponsors and to publish this information going forward. 
CONCLUSION 
Mitigation banking represents an innovative solution to the complex 
problem of how we allow for beneficial economic development while also 
protecting the ecological value that wetlands provide. Rooted in the idea that 
environmental markets can improve social outcomes, the mitigation banking 
program would enjoy greater efficiency and more market participation if the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers made reporting credit prices mandatory and 
made the information available to the public. The benefits of this market 
efficiency accrue exponentially because, with greater market participation 
and a wider array of mitigation banks offering credits, the Corps can be more 
selective in determining which credits satisfy offset requirements based on 
the type and functionality of the impacted wetlands. This change would 
improve outcomes not only for entrepreneurs who seek profitable investment 
opportunities and developers who aim to purchase wetland credits, but also 
for environmentalists and others who look to the Corps and other regulatory 
agencies for the implementation of the nation’s wetland protection laws. 
 
 
 203 Letter from Laura Hendricks, Director, Coalition to Protect Puget Sound and Puget Sound 
Habitat, to Karen Urelius, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.nws.usace.army. 
mil/Portals/27/docs/regulatory/160913-Comments%20Received%20on%20NWS%20Proposed% 
20Regional%20Condtions%20for%202017%20NWPs/Coalition%20to%20Protect%20Puget%20Sound
/Coalition%20to%20Protect%20Puget%20Sound.pdf [https://perma.cc/63FW-E3UC] (commenting on 
the Corps’s operation of a permitting program for shellfish aquaculture). 
 204 See supra notes 195–201 and accompanying text. 
 205 See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
406 
 
